find that acquirers with more anti-takeover provisions (ATPs) earn lower announcement returns. We confirm this finding using an extended sample, but show that the observed 'ATP effect' can be explained by an omitted variable, takeover premium, which captures managerial hubris in acquiring firms. Our results suggest that ATPs do not cause managers to seek out value destroying takeovers but, at best, managerial hubris. This is consistent with related findings that ATPs do not cause lower stock returns for firms in general (Core, Guay, and Rusticus (2006)). Our findings are robust to a range of econometric issues. 
Introduction
In this paper, we re-examine the relationship between acquirer takeover announcement returns and anti-takeover provisions (ATPs). Masulis et al. (2007) find that acquirers with more ATPs, which they refer to as dictatorships, earn lower announcement returns.
1 They argue that this supports their main hypothesis that ATPs protect managers from the market for corporate control, thereby inducing possible agency conflicts and encouraging value-destroying acquisitions. ATPs, which include for example, poison pills, classified or staggered boards and charter amendments, are argued to weaken shareholder rights by making it more difficult for shareholders and the market for corporate control to discipline poorly performing mangers. Masulis et al. (2007) take the view that protection from the takeover market induces agency conflicts and, more importantly from a shareholder value perspective, encourages investment decisions of lower quality, as reflected in lower announcement returns. This result follows the widely held view that in an efficient market, weak governance structures, as captured by the presence of more ATPs, does not convey 'new' information about future cash flows, and so should not be priced (Core, Holthausen, and Larcker (1999) ). Core et al. (2006) show that investors appear to be fully aware of the under/over performance of high/low-ATP firms, as indicated by lower earnings forecasts and, further, find no significant difference in stock returns between the groups around earnings announcements. They also fail to find a significant difference in the likelihood of takeover between high/low-ATP firms, so lower returns are unlikely to be attributable to high-ATP firms losing out in receiving a takeover premium. More recently, Bates, Becher and Lemmon (2008) show that the existence of a classified board has no impact on takeover success, once a firm has been targeted, indicating that classified boards do not frustrate takeover completion.
1 Conversely, firms with fewer ATPs are referred to as democracies. Dictatorship and democracy firms are defined using the median value for ATPs for the sample. In this paper, we refer to firms with the number of ATPs above (below) the median value as 'high' ('low') ATP firms. 4 Core et al. 's (2006) results support a related literature that shows no link between ATPs and firm value, measured as price-to-book or Tobin's q. Lehn, Patro, and Zhao (2007) show that once pre-ATP firm value is controlled for in a cross-sectional regression of firm value on ATPs (and other controls), the ATP effect becomes insignificant, suggesting that ATPs do not cause lower firm
values. This result is in stark contrast to earlier findings in Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) , Bebchuk, Cohen, and Farrell (2004) and Bebchuk and Cohen (2005) , who show a negative and significant correlation between firm value and ATPs. However, these latter studies do not properly control for pre-ATP firm performance, so their results are more consistent with low-value firms adopting ATPs (possibly for entrenchment purposes) as opposed to ATPs actually causing lower values. This causality interpretation also has some support from related studies that examine operating performance pre-and post ATP-adoption. For example, Danielson and Karpoff (2006) show that for a sample of pre-ATP adopting firms, operating performance actually increases modestly over a 5-year post-adoption period. These recent findings are clearly at odds with value destruction associated with ATPs. This raises the question as to why the market appears to react differently to high/low-ATP firms during takeover announcements. This motivates a re-examination of this issue.
We hypothesize that the observed ATP effect arises because of an omitted variable bias in the Masulis et al. (2007) baseline model. The omitted variable explanation suggests that poorly specified or omitted variable(s) in the regression model of announcement acquirer returns on ATPs explain differences in high/low-ATP returns. Specifically, we hypothesize that the Masulis et al.
(2007) baseline model does not adequately control for possible hubris (Roll (1986) ) or managerial mistakes in estimating the gains to the takeover. We believe that hubris is a reasonable explanation for the observed ATP effect because firms with more ATPs do not actually lose in takeovers, since the announcement returns reported by Masulis et al. (2007) and in this paper are not statistically different from zero. While differences in returns between high and low-ATP firms are statistically significant, suggesting an ATP effect, the fact that firms with more ATPs do not lose from a statistical viewpoint suggests possible hubris and not value destruction (Berkovitch and Naranyan 5 (1993) ).
2 From a more practical viewpoint, since most firms incorporated ATPs in the late 1980s
(possibly as a response to the hostile takeover wave), why should they have any impact on managerial investment decisions for the next 20 or so years? Assuming that CEOs are replaced on average every 5 years, this implies that all new CEOs to firms that have, e.g., a classified board in place, suddenly come under its magic spell and start investing in loss making takeover deals! Takeover premium (excess of transaction value over target value) is generally used as a proxy to capture hubris. If more ATPs insulate managers from the discipline of the market for corporate control, then this may encourage hubris and overpayment. Masulis et al. (2007) do not directly control for overpayment, but do include a control for firm size in their model. They argue that firm size is a natural takeover defense and so, in addition to controlling for possible hubris, may also serve as a proxy for managerial entrenchment. They find a significant negative correlation between firm size and acquirer returns, consistent with both hubris and entrenchment hypotheses.
We also find firm size to be negative and significant. However, adding premium to the baseline regression model not only renders ATPs statistically insignificant, but also firm size, suggesting that premium is a better proxy for managerial hubris than firm size. 3 As expected, premium is negative and highly significant, consistent with overpayment reducing returns to acquiring firms.
A possible drawback in using premium as a proxy for hubris and overpayment is that higher premiums may also reflect higher expected synergies from the deal for some acquiring managers, and so reflect deal quality. This suggests that premium could be asymmetric across high/low-ATP acquirers, if high (low)-ATPs acquiring managers can be categorized by value-reducing/neutral (enhancing) motives. We deal with this issue by estimating separate regressions for high/low-ATP 2 Masulis et al. (2007) find that firms with more ATPs earn lower abnormal returns, ranging from -0.38% to -0.05%, which are not significantly different from zero. We report similar values, ranging from -0.27% to 0.09%, again not statistically significant. Note that for the combined acquirer and target returns, the values will be more positive since target firms on average gain significantly from takeovers, again suggesting that high-ATP acquirers do not lose.
3 Surprisingly, estimating a reduced-form regression of acquirer returns on ATPs and firm size alone suggests that the ATP effect is only observed in one out of the three governance indices examined, indicating that lower returns to acquirers with more ATPs can largely be explained by the well documented 'size-effect' in acquirer returns (Moeller et al. (2004) . We find that the ATP effect only occurs consistently across all three indices when additional control variables used in the Masulis et al. (2007) model are added to the regression. We discuss this further in Section III. 6 acquirer groups. If takeovers by firms with fewer ATPs are primarily motivated by synergy, we predict a positive or insignificant correlation between premium and returns. On the other hand, if acquirers with more ATPs are more likely to overpay due to hubris, we expect a negative and significant correlation between premium and returns. Our results bear this out, suggesting that for high-ATP acquirers, premium reflects overpayment, and so hubris is the primary motive.
We also acknowledge some econometric limitations in using premium as a proxy for hubris, including possible measurement error and endogeneity. The measurement error problem occurs because premium can vary considerably depending on what day prior to the takeover announcement date target value is measured and on the availability of accurate transaction values.
We address this issue by calculating several premium measures using different sources, including SDC platinum and CRSP databases, and also measure target value over a range of days prior to the takeover announcement date. Our results are not sensitive to alternative premium measures.
The endogeneity issue is particularly troublesome for corporate governance studies (see Larcker and Rusticus (2005) ) and tends to arise because of omitted variables that help determine one or more independent variables and are also correlated with the dependent variable, acquirer announcement returns. On the basis of simple pair-wise correlations, we believe that excluding premium results in an endogeneity problem due to the omission of a variable that is highly correlated with acquirer returns and other control variables in the model (e.g., firm size). The literature suggests, however, that premium is also likely to be endogenous with respect to other omitted variables from the Masulis et al. (2007) baseline regression, including the existence of overvalued equity (Jensen (2005) ), the mood of the deal (hostile or friendly), geographical location (cross-border), and the number of bidders (competed) -all of which are also likely to be correlated with the dependent variable, acquirer returns (Moeller et al. (2004) ). To address the omitted variable issue, we use a modified model including additional variables as suggested by theory to capture firm and deal characteristics that are correlated with acquirer returns. Since this approach might also lead to collinearity problems, we also use an alternative measure of hubris, using the residuals (i.e., unexplained premium) from a regression of premium on common factors used in the literature to 7 explain premium (Schwert (2000) , Officer (2005) ). This specification has the effect of 'stripping out' factors that are correlated or determine premium and so provides a 'cleaner' measure of hubris and overpayment. Our results remain unchanged when we use this alternative measure.
The results suggest that the ATP effect observed by Masulis et al. (2007) investments. This is confirmed by the observation that firms with more ATPs do not, from a statistical viewpoint, lose in takeovers. This issue has important policy implications for the legislation of ATPs given the growing pressure to prohibit or restrict the use of ATPs. While ATPs may be undesirable from a shareholder perspective, the evidence in this paper suggests that shareholders should not be overly concerned that ATPs cause managers to engage in value destruction via takeovers. Our results complement Bates et al.'s (2008) findings, that ATPs (specifically, classified boards), neither entrench nor facilitate managerial self-dealing in completed takeovers. Second, results from our modified model uncover some interesting findings with respect to overvalued equity, which we measure using a price-to-residual-income-valuation model (Dong, Hirshleifer, Richardson, and Teoh (2006) Insert Table I about here The IRRC database primarily comprises of large S&P 500 firms that constitute over 90% of US stock market capitalization (Bebchuk et al. (2004) ). However, post-1998 IRRC publications now include smaller firms. The IRRC has published data in 1990, 1993, 1995, 1998, 2000, 2002, and 2004 . This paper assumes that firms maintain the previous publication's provisions in between 9 publication dates (following Gompers et al. (2003) , Masulis et al. (2007) ). In Section IV of the paper, we test the sensitivity of our results to this assumption.
The sample indicates a gradual increase in activity during the early to mid-1990s, with significant increases in both the number and transaction values from 1998 (see Table I ). Similar to Masulis et al. (2007) and Moeller et al. (2004) , transaction values and bidder size increased significantly during 1999 and 2000 -a period generally regarded as the 'bubble' period.
Interestingly, the large differences in mean and median values indicate the existence of some very large bidders and deals. We examine whether this impacts on our results in Section IV. summing to a maximum of 24 points. 4 Firms are assigned to portfolios based on the median value for each index. Specifically, firms are assigned to high (low) portfolios if they have a GIM score of at least 14 or 10 (no more than 5 or 9). 5 The second governance measure, BCF, is based on the Bebchuk et al. (2004) classification system and incorporates only six key ATPs from the GIM.
These provisions include classified or staggered boards, limits to shareholder by-law and charter amendments, supermajority requirements for takeovers, poison pills, and golden parachutes. BCF classifies firms into high (low) portfolios if they have a BCF score of at least 3 (no more than 2).
The third measure assesses the impact of classified or staggered boards (CBOARD), taking a value of 1 for high-ATP acquirers and zero for low-ATP acquirers.
The paper controls for bidder and deal characteristics that may affect acquirer returns.
Previous studies find lower returns for firms with larger size (Moeller et al. (2004) , and lower growth options, measured using Tobin's q (Moeller et al. (2004) ). Abnormal returns are predicted to increase for acquisitions that occur during a merger wave (Moeller et al. (2004) ) or that involve high-tech firms (Loughran and Ritter (2004) ); however, they should decrease for large technology acquisitions (Masulis et al. (2007) ) and diversifying acquisitions (Moeller and Schlingemann (2005) ). Method of payment (Travlos (1987) ), target status, and the interaction thereof affects abnormal returns (Chang (1998 ), Fuller et al. (2002 The descriptive statistics reported in Table II indicate that bidders earn positive and significant abnormal returns on average, with a mean (median) equally-weighted CAR (EWCAR) of 0.30% (0.10%). These numbers are consistent with Masulis et al. (2007), who find a mean (median) EWCAR of 0.22% (0.10%). 6 The average number of ATPs in our sample of acquirers is 9.42 (GIM), with 63% of firms having a classified board (CBOARD) in place. Again, these statistics are similar to those reported by Masulis et al. (2007) . In terms of bidder characteristics, our sample of firms are larger than Masulis et al. (2007) with a mean (median) of $12 ($2.3) billion, compared to $9 (1.99) billion reported by them. Leverage is also higher at 24% (versus 15%), but
Tobin's q is lower at 1.83 (versus 1.98).
Insert Table II about here The results in Table III whereas low-ATP firms gain about 3 cents per dollar invested, suggesting a stronger size-effect for firms with more ATPs. However, the losses for high-ATP firms are not statistically significant, again suggesting possible hubris and overpayment, as opposed to value destruction. While we control for acquirer size in our cross-sectional regressions using book and market value definitions,
we also show later in the paper that firm size alone explains a large part of the observed ATP effect.
Insert Table III and IV about here   6 Restricting the sample to the same time-period (1990) (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) as Masulis et al. (2007) gives an EWCAR of 0.21%, which is similar to the 0.215% reported by them. Table IV reports descriptive statistics for variables sorted by governance index. We also include some new variables (see Appendix for definitions), which we will use later in our modified regression model. Firms with more ATPs are generally larger in size, are less likely to be overvalued (PRIV) and have lower growth options (Tobin's q). Surprisingly, takeover premiums are also significantly lower for high-ATP firms, although as we will see later in the paper, it is not the absolute size of the premium alone that signals hubris, but its correlation with announcement returns. High-ATP firms also have higher leverage, and are more likely to be involved in several deals (serial), which has been used in prior literature as a measure of overconfidence and hubris (Fuller et al. (2002) ). The Pearson correlation matrix in Table V confirms the negative correlation between acquirer returns and governance indices. As expected, firm size, overvaluation (PRIV) and premium are all negatively correlated with returns. Also of interest is the correlation between our overvaluation measure (PRIV) and Tobin's q, which at only 22%, suggests that PRIV and q capture different aspects of a firm's value, which we discuss further in Section III.
Insert Table V and VI about here   Table VI Table VI also reports the results for a reduced-form regression, including only the governance indices and firm size. The results provide strong evidence that the ATP effect can largely be explained by the well documented size-effect in acquirer returns (Moeller et al. (2004) with only the BCF index 7
The positive and significant sign on free cash flow is opposite to that predicted by Jensen's (1986) theory. This is because the inclusion of ATPs may also proxy for possible agency costs related to free cash flow, so the free cash flow variable reflects profitability, which is predicted to be positively correlated with returns.
13 remaining significant. 8 We suspect that firm size captures, albeit imperfectly, possible hubris and overpayment by high-ATP firms, which is consistent with Moeller's et al. (2004) observation that larger firms are more likely to suffer from hubris. We examine this in greater detail in the next section.
III. Explaining the ATP effect
The results so far suggest that firms with fewer ATPs generate higher announcement returns, even after controlling for firm and deal characteristics. Masulis et al. (p.1,853, 2007) interpret their results as suggesting that protection from the takeover market (more ATPs)
encourages 'empire-building acquisitions that destroy shareholder value'. However, while high-ATP firms generate negative returns, they are not statistically different from zero, which at best indicates possible hubris and overpayment as opposed to value destruction. We hypothesize that firms with more ATPs face less discipline from the takeover market and through proxy contests, which may encourage managerial hubris. Hubris is argued to cause overconfidence and overpayment (Roll (1986) ), so we expect premium to be negatively correlated with acquirer returns, which reflects the transfer of wealth from acquirer to target shareholders.
A. Is Premium an Omitted Variable?
The literature presents two measures of premium. First, some papers stipulate that premium is the target's cumulative abnormal return (CAR) from a date prior to the announcement to a date after the announcement (Comment and Schwert (1995) , Schwert (2000) , Field and Karpoff (2002)).
Second, others define premium as the transaction value over the target's market capitalization prior to the announcement (Byrd and Hickman ( Lie (2006)). This paper uses the second method because bidder and target abnormal returns are 8
It is not surprising that firm size does not explain away the ATP effect using the BCF-index since the descriptive statistics reported in Table IV indicate no significant difference in size, whereas for the GIM and CBOARD indices high-ATP acquirers are significantly larger than low-ATP suggesting a stronger size-effect. 14 endogenous (i.e., simultaneously determined). Thus, including target CARs in an OLS regression would induce inconsistent estimates, which the second definition avoids.
In calculating premium, target market value is measured over various days prior to the takeover announcement date, including the day prior, 3, 11 and 21 days prior -giving a total of 4 premium measures. We also source target market value data from different sources, including SDC and CRSP. Target market value is defined as the price on each of the four days times the number of shares outstanding at the accounting year-end. On comparing target price on each day across the two databases we find no significant differences in reported values. Noteworthy also is the impact that premium has on firm size, which is now insignificant. This result is consistent with Moeller et al. (2004) who find some evidence that larger acquirers pay higher premiums, although the size effect remains in their regression after controlling for premium.
One concern with including premium in the regression is that it is likely to be endogenous with respect to other variables in the regression model (e.g., firm size, method of payment) and also omitted variables from the regression. The first issue does not concern us too much since premium 9
The result also holds when we constrain the sample to the 1990-2003 time period examined by Masulis et al. (2007) . 15 remains negative and highly significant (and ATPs insignificant) when other controls are excluded as reported in the reduced-form regression in Table VII . The second issue is more troubling since there could be numerous omitted variables from the model that could explain both premium and acquirer returns. To attempt to alleviate this concern we return to theory as recommended by Larcker and Rusticus (2005) to guide us on additional variables that may be omitted from the model. 10 The literature suggests several variables that are correlated with acquirer returns, and that are also likely to be correlated with premium. More recently, acquirer returns have been shown to decrease with: (1) the existence of overvalued equity (Dong et al. (2006); (2) competition (Bradley et al. (1988) , Lang et al. (1996) , Boone and Mulherin (2003) ); (3) deal friendliness (Schwert (2000) ); (4) geographic-diversification (Moeller and Schlingemann (2005) ); and (5) serialacquisitions, which reflect over-confidence (Fuller et al. (2002) ). Lastly, volume, which addresses pre-announcement informed trade, is predicted to increase returns since it implies that information asymmetry reduces pre-announcement stock price. Hence, takeover announcements, which reveal information, should increase prices and returns (Easley and O'Hara (2004), Botosan and Plumlee (2005) ). Definitions of variables 2 to 6 are provided in Table A1 in Appendix A and Table IV provides descriptive statistics for these new variables sorted by governance index. Variable 1, overvalued equity, requires more attention and is discussed in more detail in Appendix B.
11 Table VIII reports the results of our modified model which includes the additional variables and shows that the results remain unchanged (models 1 to 3). It is noteworthy that including premium and the additional variables appears to eliminate omitted variable bias since it renders the constants insignificant and Ramsay RESET tests find no omitted variable bias. Conversely, models that do not include premium and the new variables (i.e., those reported in Table VI and VII) have significant constants and Ramsay RESET tests detect omitted variable bias. As predicted, deal friendliness and our proxy for overvalued equity (PRIV) significantly reduce acquirer returns. The 10 Naturally, this implies that the underlying structural equation is poorly specified, at least at the operational level.
11
Following Moeller et al. (2004) , we also make some minor modifications to our proxy for firm size and free cash flow. Specifically, we replace log total assets with log market value (as the proxy for size) and scale free cash flow with market value as opposed to total assets. Moeller et al. (2004) suggests that market values influence managers' decision-making more than book values. 16 latter result provides some support for Jensen's (2005) agency costs theory related to overvalued equity and suggests that PRIV is a more appropriate measure of misvaluation than metrics used in prior studies, e.g., Tobin's q and price-to-book (PB). This is probably because, unlike q or price-tobook, PRIV is calculated using analyst's forecasts of earnings, so growth options should be filtered out of price. 12 Further, PRIV has been shown to predict stock returns and track firm value more accurately than either Tobin's q or PB (Lee, Myers, and Swaminathan (1999)).
Insert Table VIII about here Model 4 in Table VIII also confirms that only firms with more ATPs are penalized for overpaying, suggesting that premium is asymmetric. 13 This indicates that hubris/overpayment is more prevalent amongst high-ATP firms, supporting our main hypothesis. This result suggests that differences in returns between low/high-ATP firms can be explained by hubris, and more importantly, firms with more ATPs do not engage in value destroying takeovers. The insignificant coefficient on premium for low-ATP firms also suggests that higher premiums paid by these firms are more likely to be motivated by synergy reasons. PRIV is also only significant for acquirers with fewer ATPs, indicating that they drive the overvalued equity effect.
B. Endogeneity concerns
One concern with using premium is that it is likely to be endogenous with respect to other variables in the regression model, including firm size, multiple bidders and method of payment.
Also, there may be collinearity problems when premium is included in the model given that it is positively correlated (see Table V ) with other variables, including firm size, relative size, Tobin's q and overvaluation (PRIV). To address these concerns, we test the robustness of the results to an alternative measure, 'unexplained premium', calculated using the residuals from a first-stage
12
Note that this assumes that analyst forecasts act as perfect filters for growth, which may not be the case. Dong et al. (2006) show that adding further controls (i.e., price-to-book) to their multivariate regression model (see Table V in their paper) does not impact on the relation between PRIV and acquirer returns. We also find this to be the case in unreported results.
13
Instead of dividing the sample into high and low-ATP groups, we also use an interaction term to capture high-ATP premium acquirers (high ATP dummy multiplied by premium) and arrive at the same conclusions.
17
regression of premium on variables that have commonly been used in the literature (Schwert (2000) , Officer (2005) ) to explain premium, including the governance indices. This has the effect of 'stripping out' factors within the model that are correlated with or determine premium, and so helps to address some of the endogeneity and collinearity issues. Table IX reports the results from these regressions and shows that several variables are significantly and positively related to premium, including firm size, relative deal size, Tobin's q and the level of takeover activity within an industry. The negative and significant correlation with both governance indices confirms the descriptive statistics reported in Table IV for premium. The models do a reasonable job at explaining premium with R 2 of about 24%, which is significantly higher than similar models reported by prior research (for example, Moeller et al. (2004) reports an R 2 of 4%). More importantly, the results in Table X indicate that our findings remain unchanged when we use this alternative measure, indicating that differences in premium mitigate the ATP effect.
14 Consistent with the results reported in model 4 of Table VIII , only high-ATP firms get penalized for overpaying, confirming our hypothesis that ATPs give rise to a 'hubris effect'.
Insert Table IX and X about here
IV. Other Econometric and Model Specification Issues
This section examines the impact, if any, of several econometric issues that may impact on the robustness of our results. We examine several model based tests, including examining the impact of outliers through the use of quantile regressions, and several specification-type tests.
A. Model Based Sensitivity Tests
The results so far suggest that once managerial hubris is controlled for, ATPs have no impact on the average acquiring firm. This, however, does not mitigate the possibility that ATPs impact on the returns of certain firms, for example, at the tails of the distribution, even after
14
In unreported results, we also include the predicted values from the premium regression (i.e., what acquirers should have paid) and find similar results to those reported in Table X.   18 controlling for managerial hubris. To address this possibility, we re-estimate our modified model reported in Table VIII using quantile regressions (Koenker and Basset (1978) ). Quantile regressions allow for the relaxation of the normality assumption related to the distribution of the errors in OLS and show whether outliers impact on the reported results. The results reported in Table XI indicate that ATPs have no significant impact on acquirer returns in 8 of the 9 quantile regressions. While there is some evidence of a significant effect at the 0.7 quantile, it is only significant at the 10% level. On the other hand, premium is significant and negative across 8 of the 9 quantiles, with only the 0.9 quantile of acquirer returns appearing insignificant. Interestingly, premium has a larger impact at lower levels of the distribution of acquirer returns. This is consistent with our expectations in that acquirers who perform worse (i.e., generate lower returns) in takeovers get penalized more for overpaying. The results also indicate that the negative effect of overvalued equity (PRIV) is more pronounced in the upper tails, although remains significant in 6 out of the 9 quantiles.
The second model-based test we employ is principal components regressions to ensure that collinearity does not induce the hubris effect. We estimate a regression of acquirer abnormal returns on each governance index and six factors that reflect the other control variables. In unreported results, ATPs are negative and significant before controlling for managerial hubris (premium), and are insignificant thereafter. While these results are economically meaningless since the individual variables do not represent any underlying economic theory (Greene (2003)), they at least demonstrate that the results are robust to multicollinearity concerns.
B. Other Specification Tests
We conduct a further battery of robustness tests to ensure the results are not sensitive to variable definitions. First, the results are robust to abnormal return specification. Abnormal returns calculated using a market model may yield inconsistent market model parameters due to thin trading and non-synchronous trading (Brown and Warner (1985) ). The paper tests sensitivity using two alternative specifications. First, we estimate Bollserslav's (1986) GARCH (1,1) model, which controls for auto-regressive conditional heteroskedasticity and time-varying volatility. Second, we sample period from 1990-1999; (3) in models that only include observations in years that the IRRC publishes governance reports (1990, 1993, 1995, 1998, 2000, 2002, 2004) ; and (4) a sample that uses governance indices from the following IRRC report for the years in between IRRC reports.
The results are not sensitive to independent variable specification. Our findings hold in models that (1) replace the log of total assets with the log market value of assets as a measure of firm size; (2) replace free cash flow with Compustat's operating cash flow (item308); (3) divide leverage by market value of assets as opposed to book value of total assets; and (4) include a Delaware incorporation dummy.
The results are also not due to large loss deals (Moeller et al. (2005) Below we further discuss some of the more salient results from our empirical research, in particular, how they relate to other research related to overvaluation and hubris.
A. Overvaluation
Our findings suggest that PRIV is a better measure of overvaluation (than Tobin's q) for capturing agency conflicts, with a negative and highly significant correlation with acquirer returns.
We show that the overvaluation effect is more pronounced in low-ATP firms, suggesting that they probably take advantage of overvalued equity to acquire assets more cheaply, which is consistent with Shleifer and Vishny (2003) . The related literature provides some clues as to whether our results for PRIV are more consistent with agency costs of overvalued equity (Jensen (2005)) or managers simply exploiting overvalued equity to acquire assets at a lower cost. We know from the descriptive statistics in Table IV that not only do low-ATP firms pay higher premiums, based on the GIM index they are also more likely to use stock as the method of consideration. If target management are aware that bidder stock is overvalued, then stock is less attractive, which may increase the pressure on the bidder to offer a higher premium (Dong et al. (2006)). If target firms are also overvalued, this provides an additional incentive for target managers to accept bidder overvalued stock so they can 'cash-out' (Shleifer and Vishny (2003) ). On the other hand, the Q-21 theory suggests that bidders with higher growth options (Tobin's q or PB) are in a better position to generate higher gains when matched with undervalued targets. Under these circumstances, the bidder may be willing to share more of the gains with the target, which may explain the higher premiums paid. The results in Table IV are also consistent with this theory, since low-ATP acquirers have significantly higher growth options, as measured using Tobin's q. However, higher growth options do not drive the higher premiums paid by low-ATP acquirers. In unreported results, re-estimating the premium regressions for low/high-ATP groups, Tobin's q becomes insignificant, whereas PRIV is positive and significant, confirming that overvalued equity and not the q-theory drives the higher premiums paid by low-ATP acquirers.
B. Hubris and Overpayment
The discussion above suggests that overvalued equity reduces returns to low-ATP firms and, further, causes them to pay higher premiums compared to high-ATP firms. Interestingly, however, only high-ATP firms get penalized for overpayment -that is, the correlation between premium and acquirer returns is only significant and negative for high-ATP acquirers. So, why do high-ATP firms get penalized for paying lower premiums compared to low-ATP firms? Clearly, the market perceives the level of premium paid by high-ATP acquirers as too high given the targetthat is, the 41-46% median premium paid by high-ATP firms is viewed excessive given the level of synergies in the deal. Given the asymmetric nature of premium, it also suggests that the market penalizes managers with hubris motivations. We also suspect that the market also penalizes high-ATP firms because premium also captures the well documented size-effect in acquirer returns. 
The paper utilizes a parsimonious 3-year forecast horizon since an infinite sum is impractical and forecast horizons exceeding 3 years do not significantly improve RIV quality (Lee et al. (1999) ). Equation (A2) specifies the 3-year model: Book value of equity, the cost of equity and the forecasted ROE and EPS are discussed further below.
A. Book value of equity:
it B is the most recent book value of equity preceding the takeover (Compustat item 60). on average of total assets.
B. Cost of equity
RIV requires a discount rate commensurate with the riskiness of cash flows to equity holders. The cost of equity is determined using the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM), which comprises of a time-varying riskless rate and a time-varying firm-specific risk premium:
; where f r is the riskless rate (monthly-annualized T-Bill rate); m r , the market return and β the firm's sensitivity to systematic risk. The risk premium is time varying and comprises of the annualized monthly market return for the previous 30 years (following Dong et al.
2006
) and the contemporaneous riskless rate. Market return, m r , is the annualized monthly return on the NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ value-weighted market portfolio (following Ang and Cheng (2003) ).
C. Forecasted ROE and Earnings
RIV requires forecasts of earnings. EPS forecasts are taken from I/B/E/S. Forecast earnings are calculated as I/B/E/S EPS multiplied by I/B/E/S shares outstanding. Where I/B/E/S does not cover a firm, the paper extrapolates historical earnings using the long-term growth rate to maintain the sample size. 
TABLE III Announcement Abnormal Returns by Governance Index
Mean abnormal returns are calculated as the 5-day OLS market model CAR. The table reports equally-weighted (EWCAR), 2005 dollar value ($AR), value-weighted (VWCAR) and return per dollar invested ($AR/TV). Median values are in parentheses. Superscripts ***, **, and * denotes statistical significance using a two-tailed test at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
TABLE VII Masulis et al. (2007) Baseline Model with Premium and a Reduced-Form Model
The Masulis et al. (2007) baseline model is estimated with our proxy for hubris (Premium) using a sample of 1,128 acquisitions from 1990 to 2005. The 5-day OLS market model CAR (in percentages) is the dependant variable. Governance represents the GIM, BCF, and CBOARD governance indices. Premium is the takeover premium, calculated as the transaction value over the target's price 3 days prior to the takeover announcement. High-ATP acquirers have a GIM≥10 or BCF≥3. Low-ATP acquirers have a GIM≤9 or BCF≤2. Other variable definitions are defined in Appendix A. Standard errors denoted in parentheses are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and acquirer clustering. Superscripts ***, **, * denotes significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. All regressions control for year fixed effects (not reported). 
TABLE VIII The Modified Model
The modified model is estimated using a sample of 1,124 acquisitions from 1990 to 2005. The 5-day OLS market model CAR (in percentages) is the dependant variable. Governance represents the GIM, BCF, and CBOARD governance indices. Premium is the takeover premium, calculated as the transaction value over the target's price 3 days prior to the takeover announcement. High-ATP acquirers have a GIM≥10 or BCF≥3. Low-ATP acquirers have a GIM≤9 or BCF≤2. Other variable definitions are defined in Appendix A. Standard errors denoted in parentheses are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and acquirer clustering. Superscripts ***, **, * denotes significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. All regressions control for year fixed effects (not reported).
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TABLE X The Modified Model with Unexplained Premium
The modified model is estimated using a sample of 1,124 acquisitions from 1990 to 2005. The 5-day OLS market model CAR (in percentages) is the dependant variable. Governance represents the GIM, BCF, and CBOARD governance indices. Unexplained premium is calculated as the residual from a regression on premium of all factors commonly used to explain premium (see Table IX ). High-ATP acquirers have a GIM≥10 or BCF≥3. Low-ATP acquirers have a GIM≤9 or BCF≤2. Other variables are defined in Appendix A. Standard errors denoted in parentheses are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and acquirer clustering. Superscripts ***, **, * denotes significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. All regressions control for year fixed effects (not reported).
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TABLE XI Quantile Regressions
The quantile regressions are estimated using a sample of 1,124 acquisitions from 1990 to 2005. The 5-day OLS market model CAR (in percentages) is the dependant variable. The first five variables reported in Table VIII are reported, with remaining suppressed for reporting convenience. Governance is measured using the GIM governance index. Premium is the takeover premium, calculated as the transaction value over the target's price 3 days prior to the takeover announcement. Other variables are defined in Appendix A. Superscripts ***, **, * denotes significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. All regressions control for year fixed effects (not reported). 
